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VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: SUGGESTED CHANGES
IN THE LAW THROUGH POLICY
ANALYSIS
RANDY S. PARLEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Should an employer or principal be held vicariously lia-
ble for punitive damages assessed against an agent? There is
no uniform rule throughout the states which governs this is-
sue.' Vicarious punitive liability poses difficult problems of
policy upon which courts are divided into opposing camps.2
It has been stated:
While entrepreneurial liability for compensatory damages
has been widely accepted, such liability for punitive dam-
ages has engendered considerably more controversy, since
many of the justifications offered in support of the former
are of dubious applicability to the latter
Indeed, the issue of vicarious punitive liability is "chief
among the various controversies which have surrounded pu-
nitive damages .... -4
* B.A., University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 1976; M.A., University of Wiscon-
sin, Milwaukee, 1981; J.D., Marquette University Law School, 1983; associate, Peter-
son, Johnson & Murray, S.C., Milwaukee. The author wishes to thank Professors
James D. Ghiardi and John J. Kircher of Marquette University Law School for their
assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. 5 M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL & D. AXELROD, DAMAGES IN TORT
ACTIONS § 40.51[l] (1982) [hereinafter cited as M. MINZER & J. NATES]; Note, 19
SYRACUSE L. REv. 189, 191 (1967).
2. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 80, at 282 (1935).
For an examination of the various positions the courts have taken on the issue of
vicarious punitive liability and other related issues, see Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 826
(1979).
This historical division between the courts has recently shifted. The scope of em-
ployment rule, long the majority rule, is now followed in a minority of jurisdictions.
See infra note 27 and accompanying text. The Restatement rule, once the minority
position, has now become the rule in most jurisdictions. See infra note 49 and accom-
panying text.
3. Comment, The Assessment ofPunitive Damages Against an Entrepreneurfor the
Malicious Tort ofHis Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, 1296 (1961) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original).
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 12 (4th ed. 1971).
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The only way vicarious liability for punitive damages
can be justified is through an assessment of whether the pur-
poses for punitive damages are served when punitive liabil-
ity is imposed vicariously.5 The purpose of this Article is to
set forth the various rules of liability which the courts have
formulated in this area. The underlying policy bases for
these rules - often unrecognized by many courts - will be
identified, explained, and criticized. Finally, changes in the
law will be suggested which would ensure that punitive dam-
ages are vicariously imposed only when the purposes for pu-
nitive damages would be furthered.
First, however, it is necessary to briefly discuss the gen-
eral policy considerations that underlie both punitive dam-
ages and vicarious liability.
II. GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Punitive Damages
Although punitive damages have recently received in-
creased attention in the legal literature, the doctrine is
deeply ingrained in history.6 As generally construed, puni-
tive damages may be awarded against a defendant whose
conduct in causing harm was "malicious, oppressive, fraudu-
lent, willful, reckless, wantonly indifferent, or opprobrious."7
"Malice" is the term most commonly used by courts in
describing the prerequisites to punitive liability.8 Hence,
even though it is usually stated that punitive damages focus
upon the defendant's conduct, 9 it is probably more accurate
to state that they focus on the defendant's motive or evil
intent.
The purposes advanced for punitive damages are many
and varied, but four can be singled out.'0 The first is punish-
5. Comment, supra note 3, at 1297.
6. As long ago as 1869, it was stated that the doctrine of punitive damages was
"too firmly established to be shaken by anything short of legislative enactments."
Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 221 (1869).
7. M. MINZER & J. NATES, supra note 1, § 40.11, at 8.
8. Id. § 40.22.
9. See id §40.11, at 8.
10. For a complete discussion of the purposes that have been advanced for puni-
tive damages, see J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE (1983); M. MINZER & J. NATES, supra note 1, § 40.12; Note, Exemplary Damages
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ment. Punitive damages are seen as a means of punishing
undesirable, antisocial conduct not serious enough to war-
rant criminal sanctions. Second, and closely related to pun-
ishment, is deterrence. Punitive damages serve to prevent
the individual from repeating the offense and to make an
example of the defendant so that others similarly situated
will also be deterred. Third, punitive damages are seen as a
means of compensating the plaintiff for litigation costs and
attorney fees not otherwise recoverable.l And fourth, puni-
tive damages might help preserve the peace by satisfying the
impulse for revenge. Indeed, punitive damages have been
justified on the basis that, as a matter of moral necessity, a
wrongdoer should be forced to atone for the wrong done.'2
Closer scrutiny, however, limits the validity of the com-
pensatory and revenge purposes. As a general rule, punitive
damages should not function to recompense the plaintiff's
loss.' 3 The compensatory purpose can and should be satis-
fied not through the doctrine of punitive damages, but
through changes in the substantive law of compensatory
damages. Therefore, the various economically based justifi-
cations for the vicarious imposition of compensatory dam-
ages - such as risk allocation, loss distribution, or even the
"deep pocket" theory - cannot be used to justify the vicari-
ous imposition of punitive damages.' 4 Likewise, revenge is
no justification. The revenge purpose is a questionable ob-
jective of any civilized legal system.'5 Thus, the compensa-
tory and revenge purposes are of secondary importance, and
only punishment and deterrence can justify punitive dam-
ages in any meaningful sense.1 6 Unlike compensation and
in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 520-22 (1957). These avowed purposes, of
course, have not gone uncriticized. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 2, at 12-14.
11. In Connecticut, punitive damage awards are strictly limited to the costs of
litigation, less court costs. Lanese v. Carlson, 32 Conn. Supp. 163, -, 344 A.2d 361,
364 (Super. Ct. 1975).
12. See Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137,
140 (1951).
13. M. MINZER & J. NATES, supra note 1, § 40.12[1][a].
14. See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 2.04; Comment, supra note 3,
at 1304-05.
15. See Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 832-33
(1927).
16. Note, supra note 10, at 522.
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revenge, punishment and deterrence focus not upon the vic-
tim's injuries but upon the tortfeasor's conduct and motive.' 7
B. Vicarious Liability
It is elementary that a master or principal is liable for
compensatory damages caused by the wrongful act of a ser-
vant or agent acting within the scope of the agency.' 8 Vari-
ous reasons have been offered to justify this general rule.' 9
The traditional ones include the following:
[T]he master is in "control" of the servant and should bear
the responsibility for his conduct; the master has "chosen"
the servant and should therefore suffer for his wrongs;
since the master will "benefit" from the servant's acts, he
should bear their burden; although the master may be per-
sonally innocent so is the person injured, and between two
equally innocent parties, the one who initiated the enter-
prise should bear the loss; and the master should be liable
for the simple reason that he has the "deeper pocket."2
Chief among the modem justifications for vicarious lia-
bility, however, are the various economically based risk allo-
cation and loss distribution theories, generally described by
Dean Prosser as follows:
The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a
practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the em-
ployer's enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as
a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon
the employer because. . . he is better able to absorb them,
and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability in-
surance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the
community at large.2
Again, it must be reiterated that the economic theories can
only be used to justify the vicarious imposition of compensa-
tory, not punitive, damages.22 Unfortunately, legal scholars
17. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
18. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 267 (1962); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 257 (1965).
19. For a general discussion of the purposes which underlie vicarious liability,
see J. HYNES, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 37-55 (1974).
20. Comment, supra note 3, at 1296.
21. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 69, at 459.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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have not always made this distinction.3
Because vicarious liability runs counter to the deeply in-
grained fault principle in the law of torts, the doctrine has
been "viewed with suspicion and accepted with misgiv-
ings." 24 As Justice Holmes stated: "I assume that common-
sense is opposed to making one man pay for another man's
wrong, unless he actually has brought the wrong to pass
according to the ordinary canons of legal respon-
sibility ....
The vicarious imposition of punitive damages would
seem even more suspect, since it runs counter to fundamen-
tal moral principles against vicarious punishment.26 None-
theless, the courts have fashioned two major rules by which
punitive damages may be vicariously imposed.
III. THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT RULE
A. The Rule Defined
In a considerable minority of jurisdictions, a principal
will be held vicariously liable for punitive damages assessed
against an agent, without the necessity for any showing that
the principal engaged in any wrongful conduct.2 7  In other
23. See, for example, BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS, 245 (4th ed. 1926), in which
the author appeared to apply a risk allocation rationale for the vicarious imposition of
punitive damages.
24. J. HYNES, supra note 19, at 37.
25. Holmes, Agency (pt. 2), 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1891).
26. Under Mosaic legislation, "[t]he fathers shall not be put to death for the chil-
dren, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put
to death for his own sin." Deuteronomy 24:16.
27. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 214 (1973); J.
GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 5.06; W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 2, at 12;
Note, supra note 10, at 526.
The following jurisdictions, by the named authority, follow the scope of employ-
ment rule: Alabama, Avondale Mills v. Bryant, 10 Ala. App. 507, 63 So. 932 (1913);
Arizona, Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn, 9 Ariz. App. 336, 452 P.2d 117 (1969);
Arkansas, Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036,479 S.W.2d 518 (1972); Georgia,
Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. General Warehouse No. 2, 222 Ga. 164, 149 S.E.2d 72
(1966); Indiana, Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845
(1977); Kentucky, Kiser v. Neumann Co. Contractors, Inc., 426 S.W.2d 935 (Ky.
1968); Maine, Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869); Maryland, Safeway
Stores v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 122 A.2d 457 (1956); Michigan, Lucas v. Michigan
Cent. R. Co., 98 Mich. 1, 56 N.W. 1039 (1893); Mississippi, Sandifer Oil Co. v. Drew,
220 Miss. 609,71 So. 2d 752 (1954); Missouri, Johnson v. Allen, 448 S.W.2d 265 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1969); Montana, Rickman v. Safeway Stores, 124 Mont. 451, 227 P.2d 607
1984]
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words, this rule simply applies the general rule of vicarious
liability to punitive damages.28  Thus, any principal who
may be vicariously liable for compensatory damages may
also be vicariously liable for punitive damages. 29 The agent
need only have acted within the scope of the agency at the
time of the wrongful conduct; hence this rule has also been
called the "scope of employment" rule. Of course, one
might argue that conduct egregious enough to render an em-
ployee punitively liable would never be within the scope of
employment, as defined by an innocent principal. The
courts, however, have apparently not been impressed with
this argument, as the cases do not address it.
B. The Rule Evaluated
The scope of employment rule has little basis in policy,
does not further the purposes for which punitive damages
are imposed, and should be abandoned. Unfortunately,
many courts have not formulated public policy reasons be-
hind this rule,31 and cases applying it often show little analy-
sis, 32 despite the fact that courts have been warned to apply
(1951); North Carolina, Hairston v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. 220 N.C. 642, 18
S.E.2d 166 (1942); Oklahoma, Kurn v. Radencic, 193 Okla. 126, 141 P.2d 580 (1943);
Oregon, Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 271 Ore. 430, 532 P.2d 790 (1975); Penn-
sylvania, Philadelphia Traction Co. v. Orbann, 119 Pa. 37, 12 A. 816 (1888); South
Carolina, Hooper v. Hulto, 160 S.C. 404, 158 S.E. 726 (1931); Tennessee, Odom v.
Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526 (1974). There is no authority on point for the following states:
Alaska, Delaware, Illinois, New Hampshire, South Dakota and Utah. There are no
punitive damages allowed in the following states: Louisiana, McCoy v. Arkansas
Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932); Massa-
chusetts, City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 47
N.E.2d 265 (1943); Nebraska, Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960);
Washington, Standard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 607, 565 P.2d 94 (1977).
28. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 284.
29. M. MINZER & J. NATES, supra note 1, § 40.51[3], at 132-33.
30. One commentator indicated that "the mere fact that the employee acts with a
bad motive does not necessarily take him outside his employment." D. DOBBS, supra
note 27, at 214. The scope of employment doctrine has been interpreted to include
willful wrongs resulting "from an impulse or emotion arising from the employment or
in some way incident thereto." Note, 2 WM. & MARY L. REv. 485, 485 (1960).
31. Note, supra note 10, at 526.
32. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 5.06. In support of the scope of
employment rule, one court offered the dubious rationale that "the doctrine is too
deeply implanted in the law to be uprooted for no better reason than that it is illogi-
cal." Schmidt v. Minor, 150 Minn. 236, 240, 184 N.W. 964, 966 (1921).
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the rule with caution.3 3 The following analysis shows that
the deterrence and punishment purposes for punitive dam-
ages are ill served when such damages are imposed
vicariously.
1. The Deterrence Rationale.
It has been stated that deterrence is the primary purpose
which justifies the scope of employment rule.34 The deter-
rent effect is arguably operative in situations where the pun-
ishment is meted out to the actual wrongdoer, since it is the
wrongdoer who experiences the punishment and is therefore
given a reason to change. Under the scope of employment
rule, however, a vicarious punitive damage assessment can
and often will operate to "punish" an innocent principal.
Such punishment would seem to have little deterrent effect
upon the actual wrongdoer-agent. Of course, if the agent felt
that this vicariously liable principal might seek indemnity,35
or terminate the agency, some deterrent effect might be oper-
ative. This would seem, however, to be a roundabout and
unfair way of accomplishing what could more effectively be
accomplished by simply punishing the agent alone.
It has often been stated that the scope of employment
rule encourages employers to exercise greater care in select-
ing, training, or supervising employees. 6 This "employer
diligence" rationale is really a variant on the deterrence ra-
tionale, with the emphasis now upon deterring the princi-
pal's errant conduct in selecting employees rather than
deterring the agent's conduct. The employer diligence ra-
tionale lends some support to the scope of employment rule,
yet has numerous weakpoints.
First, this rationale has potency only to the extent that
the principal has sufficient behavioral control over the agent
to warrant holding the former responsible for the latter's
acts. Human behavior is notoriously difficult to predict and
33. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 258, at 352-53 (1965).
34. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 2, at 12.
35. A principal can seek indemnity from an agent for damages vicariously im-
posed, see W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 51, at 311, but it is doubtful that this would
occur in the typical employer-employee situation.
36. See, e.g., M. MINZER & J. NATES, supra note 1, § 40.51[3]; W. PROSSER, supra
note 4, § 2, at 12; Comment, supra note 3, at 1301; Note, supra note 10, at 526.
1984]
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control, especially the type of behavior that leads to punitive
damages. No amount of careful supervision and screening
of employees or other agents will eliminate all malicious be-
havior. This fact raises the possibility that a principal might
misallocate economic resources in attempting to achieve an
unrealistically high degree of agent control.
Second, it is reasonable to conclude that sufficient em-
ployer diligence is encouraged by the prospect of compensa-
tory damages alone. 7 Compensatory damages do have a
deterrent effect.38 Moreover, the wide latitude available to
juries in awarding such damages - particularly in the intan-
gible areas such as pain and suffering - raises the possibility
for compensatory verdicts of truly punitive proportions. 9
Indeed, it has been stated that the theory of punitive dam-
ages is "built into the average juror's value system. 40
A third criticism of the employer diligence rationale is
that the existence of liability insurance weakens it considera-
bly. It would appear that if the employer diligence rationale
is served by the vicarious imposition of punitive damages,
that rationale would be frustrated by permitting a principal
to shift the burden of punitive damages to an insurer. There
is near unanimity among the courts that an employer or
other principal can insure against punitive damages which
are vicariously imposed.4 1 The courts reason that public pol-
icy is not offended by allowing insurance coverage in this
situation since the principal is not the actual wrongdoer and
therefore deserves no punishment.42
37. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 774 (1977).
38. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1187-88
(1931). See also Craker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657, 676 (1875) ("Responsi-
bility for compensatory damages will be a sufficient admonition to carrier corpora-
tions to select competent and trustworthy officers.").
39. Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 226
(1960).
40. Id An early Wisconsin case provides an interesting illustration of this sys-
tem. The same case was tried three times before three juries, twice with punitive
damages allowed and once without. The verdict in each trial was the same. See Bass
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 450 (1874); Bass, 39 Wis. 636 (1876); Bass, 42 Wis.
654 (1877).
41. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 7.15, at 59. See also id § 7.31
(vicarious liability cases allowing coverage).
42. Morris, supra note 39, at 223. Cases adopting this rationale include: Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Financing Co., 75 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295
[Vol. 68:27
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To the extent that a principal has procured insurance to
cover punitive loss, there exists that much less of a motiva-
tion to exercise due care in an effort to avoid the loss.43 Iron-
ically, a principal is able to insure against punitive losses in
precisely those circumstances where the scope of employ-
ment rule applies, namely, where the principal is solely vi-
cariously liable. This fact constitutes an indictment of the
rule itself. The courts seem to recognize that allowing an
innocent, vicariously liable principal to "escape" punitive
damages through insurance violates no public policy, since
the principal deserved no punishment in the first instance.
Numerous other criticisms can be leveled against the em-
ployer diligence rationale. Under the scope of employment
rule, it would seem just as easy to assume that a sort of "re-
verse diligence" would occur, since no matter how carefully
the principal screens and trains agents, the employer will
nonetheless be held punitively liable - without fault - for
the agent's transgressions. Also, one might question the en-
tire social worth of this rationale. The employment of po-
tentially malicious individuals might help channel antisocial
tendencies into socially useful work outlets. Under the em-
ployer diligence rationale, however, the employment of such
individuals is discouraged.
2. The Punishment Rationale.
Along with deterrence, punishment is considered a major
purpose for the imposition of punitive damages.44 Serious
practical and ethical problems are raised, however, when at-
tempts are made to justify the scope of employment rule
through the punishment rationale.
As discussed earlier, punitive damages are intended to
punish the wrongdoer's evil motive or malice.45 Actual ill
will or malevolence on the part of the wrongdoer is re-
U.S. 734 (1935); and Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
43. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1306. Some deterrence might still be operative
if the principal's insurance premium increased according to claim frequency. Since
by definition insurance is a loss-spreading device, however, this effect is likely to be
minimal, if it exists at all.
44. See supra notes 10-12 & 16 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
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quired.46 The obvious problem with vicarious liability under
the scope of employment rule is that the principal does not
necessarily share the wrongdoer-agent's evil motive. Where
the motive is not shared, punishment of the principal is pa-
tently irrational and unethical.47
One might counter this with the employer diligence ra-
tionale, arguing that punitive damages punish the principal
for failing to exercise due care in the selection and training
of agents. This argument, however, ignores the essence of
the scope of employment rule. Under the rule, the princi-
pal's liability is absolute, since imputation requires no show-
ing of lack of due care or other personal fault. The employer
diligence rationale is based upon a kind of "prospective"
punishment - increased diligence is motivated through the
threat of imputed punitive sanctions, even though those
sanctions will be applied anyway where the principal is to-
tally blameless. Punishment under these circumstances has
a clearly irrational character.48
IV. THE RESTATEMENT RULE
A. The Rule Defined
The majority ofjurisdictions follow the rule that a princi-
pal cannot be held vicariously liable for punitive damages
assessed against an agent unless the principal's conduct, in
relation to the agent's, was itself somehow wrongful. 49 This
46. Ghiardi, supra note 37, at 754.
47. See, e.g., Craker v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657 (1875).
48. Not surprisingly, the punishment rationale for the scope of employment rule,
like the deterrence rationale, has been heavily criticized in the legal literature. As one
commentator has stated, "the levy of punitive damages against [a principal] is wholly
unjustifiable when the only ground for it is a purely punitive one .. " D. DOBBS,
supra note 27, § 3.9, at 215. See also J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 2.04,
at 10-12.
49. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 5.07; W. PROSSER, supra note 4,
§ 2, at 12; Note, supra note 10, at 526.
The following jurisdictions, by the named authority, follow the Restatement rule:
California, Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141
(1979); Colorado, Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979); Connecticut,
Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia of Danbury, 71 Conn. 369, 42 A. 67 (1899); Dis-
trict of Columbia, Dart Drug, Inc. v. Linthicum, 300 A.2d 442 (D.C. App. 1973);
Florida, Mercury Motors Exp., Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1981); Hawaii,
Lauer v. YMCA, 57 Hawaii 390, 557 P.2d 1334 (1976); Idaho, Openshaw v. Oregon
Auto Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 335, 487 P.2d 929 (1971); Illinois, Holda v. Kane County, 88
[Vol. 68:27
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rule has been codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 909:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a
master or other principal because of an act by an agent if,
but only if,
(a) the principal or managerial agent authorized the do-
ing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a manage-
rial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him,
or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity
and was acting in the scope of employment, or
Ill. App. 3d 522, 410 N.E.2d 552 (1980); Iowa, Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858
(Iowa 1983); Kansas, Kline v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 666 P.2d
711 (1983); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(2) (West Supp. 1984); Nevada,
Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 96 Nev. 247, 607 P.2d 569 (1980); New Jersey, Security
Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman Assoc. Inc., 108 N.J. Super. 137, 260 A.2d
248 (1970); New Mexico, Samedon Oil Corp. v. Neeld, 91 N.M. 599, 577 P.2d 1245
(1978); New York, Craven v. Bloomingdale, 171 N.Y. 439, 64 N.E. 169 (1902); North
Dakota, John Deere Co. v. Nygard Equipment, Inc., 225 N.W.2d 80 (N.D. 1974);
Ohio, Tracy v. Athens & Pomeroy Coal & Land Co., 115 Ohio St. 298, 152 N.E. 641
(1926); Rhode Island, Conti v. Winters, 86 R.I. 456, 136 A.2d 622 (1957); Texas,
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967); Vermont, Shortle
v. Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp., 137 Vt. 32, 399 A.2d 517 (1979); Virginia, Free-
man v. Sproles, 204 Va. 353, 131 S.E.2d 410 (1963); West Virginia, Addair v.
Huffmann, 156 W. Va. 592, 195 S.E.2d 739 (1973); Wisconsin, Garcia v. Sampson's,
Inc., 10 Wis. 2d 515, 103 N.W.2d 565 (1960); Wyoming, Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d
1121 (Wyo. 1981).
Wisconsin follows the Restatement rule. In Garcia v. Sampson's, Inc., 10 Wis. 2d
515, 103 N.W.2d 565 (1960), the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited and affirmed a long
history of Wisconsin cases which held that no recovery could be had for the tortious
acts of agents without proof that the principal authorized or ratified the agent's acts.
See id. at 518, 103 N.W.2d at 567. The Garcia case was subsequently cited with ap-
proval in Jeffers v. Nysse, 98 Wis. 2d 543, 551 n.3, 297 N.W.2d 495, 499 n.3 (1980);
D.R.W. Corp. v. Cordes, 65 Wis. 2d 303, 311 n.ll, 222 N.W.2d 671, 676 n.ll (1974);
and Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Straka, 47 Wis. 2d 739, 748-49, 178 N.W.2d
28, 33 (1970).
In Wisconsin, the basic legal principles related to this issue were fleshed out in
early nineteenth century cases and have not been significantly changed since. Reten-
tion of an agent after commission of a malicious tort may be held to be ratification by
the principal. See, e.g., Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 667 (1877); Craker
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657, 676 (1875). However, retention alone is insuffi-
cient to establish ratification, see Robinson v. Superior Rapid Transit Ry., 94 Wis.
345, 350, 68 N.W. 961, 963 (1896), and ratification may not be implied where the
agent was arguably retained for other purposes. See Ghiardi, supra note 37, at 773.
The Wisconsin cases also hold that ratification requires full knowledge of the
agent's acts and malice. See Bass, 42 Wis. at 662. This knowledge will not be im-
puted where the agent's acts are adverse to the principal's interests. See Ghiardi,
supra note 37, at 773-74.
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(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal
ratified or approved the act.5°
The rationale behind this Restatement section is revealed by
its commentary:
The rule stated in this Section results from the reasons for
awarding punitive damages, which make it improper ordi-
narily to award punitive damages against one who himself
is personally innocent and therefore liable only vicariously.
It is, however, within the general spirit of the rule to make
liable an employer who has recklessly employed or re-
tained a servant or employee who was known to be vicious,
if the harm resulted from that characteristic. Nor is it un-
just that a person on whose account another has acted
should be responsible for an outrageous act for which he
otherwise would not be if, with full knowledge of the act
and the way in which it was done, he ratifies it, or, in cases
in which he would be liable for the act but not subject to
punitive damages, he expresses approval of it. In these
cases, punitive damages are granted primarily because of
the principal's own wrongful conduct.5
The four categories under Restatement section 909 are
clearly disjunctive; thus a principal may be found liable for
punitive damages if any category can be proven.52 Catego-
ries (a), (b), and (d) involve wrongful conduct on the part of
the principal, separate and apart from the agent's conduct.
Category (c) does not and is justified primarily by a deter-
rence rationale. Category (c) represents an anomoly under
the Restatement and is discussed later in this Article under
the section devoted to corporate vicarious liability.5 3
The Restatement rule is partly one of vicarious liability
and partly one of direct liability. It is vicarious in the sense
that the full punitive assessment against the agent is imputed
to the principal, but direct in the sense that such imputation
will not occur unless the principal has engaged in related
wrongful conduct. It would appear that the principal's
wrongful conduct, considered apart from the agent's, may
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979). This Restatement section is
identical to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 comment b (1979) (references to
illustrations omitted).
52. M. MINZER & J. NATES, supra note 1, § 40.51[2], at 126.
53. See infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
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not itself justify a punitive award. The consequences of this
implication are addressed in the evaluation of the Restate-
ment rule undertaken later in this Article. 4 At this point,
however, the specific categories of conduct which will render
a principal punitively liable are further discussed.
1. Authorization by the Principal.
Under the Restatement rule, a principal may be held li-
ble for punitive damages assessed against an agent when the
principal authorized the agent's wrongful conduct.5 5 Cate-
gory (a) of Restatement section 909 expresses this rule,56 al-
though without explanatory illustrations.
Authorization would appear to refer primarily to situa-
tions where the principal ordered or directed an agent to en-
gage in wrongful conduct. 7 In such situations, the principal
clearly acts as a joint malicious tortfeasor 58 and should not
be able to escape liability simply because the agent was the
active wrongdoer. 9 Simply stated, the principal's malicious
motive in ordering a heinous tort deserves punishment just
as much as the agent's malicious motive in carrying out the
tort.
It should be emphasized that authorization must extend
to both the performance of the act and the manner purport-
edly authorized. Thus, if an agent is authorized to perform a
certain function but carries it out in an unauthorized man-
ner, the principal will not be held liable for punitive dam-
ages. This rule is evident in the various "security guard"
cases. For example, in Woodard v. City Stores Co.,60 the
54. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
55. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 5.08; M. MINZER & J. NATES,
supra note 1, § 40.51[2], at 126; 22 AM. JTJR. 2D Damages § 258 (1965); Note, supra
note 10, at 526. See also cases cited in Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 826, § 10 (1979).
56. See supra text accompanying note 50.
57. See cases cited in Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 826, § 10 (1979). The term authorize
"has a mandatory effect or meaning, implying a direction to act." BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 122 (5th ed. 1979).
58. Comment, supra note 3, at 1306.
59. The principal's role in authorizing a malicious tort is analogous to that of a
conspirator or aider and abettor in the criminal law. Such "parties to a crime" are as
guilty of the criminal offense as the person who directly committed it. See, e.g., Wis.
STAT. § 939.05 (1981-82).
60. 334 A.2d 189 (D.C. 1975). See also Dart Drug, Inc. v. Linthicum, 300 A.2d
442 (D.C. App. 1973); Walker v. Lord & Taylor, 236 A.D. 11, 258 N.Y.S. 96 (1932).
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plaintiff was arrested in a department store and allegedly
beaten by the security guard. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals stated that the store could not be held lia-
ble for punitive damages unless it authorized the actual beat-
ing.61 It was clear to the court that although the security
guard was authorized to arrest lawbreaking patrons, he was
not authorized to beat them.62
Admittedly, in some situations, authorization will pres-
ent difficult proof problems. One commentator would solve
these difficulties by establishing a presumption of
authorization:
There are such immense difficulties in the way of proving
actual authority, that it is necessary to establish a conclu-
sive presumption of it. A word, a gesture, or a tone may be
a sufficient indication from a master to his servant that
some lapse from the legal standard of care or honesty will
be deemed acceptable service. Yet who could prove such a
measure of complicity?63
This evidentiary concern is probably exaggerated, however,
for two reasons. First, authorization may be implied from
the principal's conduct.64 This situation might occur, for ex-
ample, where the principal knows that the agent is about to
commit a malicious tort, but does nothing to prevent it.65
Second, authorization situations are simply very rare.66 The
authorization of a malicious tort will expose the principal to
both punitive and compensatory damages and place the
business' reputation at risk, which is clearly not in the brinci-
pal's economic self-interest.67
61. Woodward, 334 A.2d at 191.
62. Id.
63. J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE § 152, at 402 (12th ed. 1966).
64. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 259 (1965).
65. See, e.g., Hartmann v. Shell Oil Co., 68 Cal. App. 3d 240, 249-50, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 244, 250-51 (1977); Fitzsimmons v. Honaker, 485 P.2d 923, 926 (Colo. Ct. App.
1971).
66. Ghiardi, supra note 37, at 772; Comment, supranote 3, at 1301. The Wiscon-
sin case of Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1103 (1900), may present an
authorization fact situation.
67. It should also be noted that a conclusive presumption of authorization would
be tantamount to a return to the scope of employment rule, with all the weaknesses of
that rule discussed earlier in this Article. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 68:27
VICAIO US LIABILITY
2. Hiring an Unfit Agent.
Under the Restatement rule, a principal may be held lia-
ble for punitive damages assessed against an agent when the
principal was reckless in employing or retaining the agent.68
Category (b) of Restatement section 909 expresses this rule
and includes the following illustration:
A employs an ejectment company to dispossess a tenant. A
knows that the company has a reputation for using undue
force in dealing with tenants. An employee of the com-
pany, in accordance with its usual methods, commits an
unprovoked battery upon B, the wife of the tenant, in order
to induce her to leave. In an action by B against A punitive
damages can properly be awarded.69
In the vast majority of cases in which a principal is held
punitively liable for recklessly hiring an unfit agent, the
agent has engaged in conduct warranting punitive dam-
ages.70 This is not a requirement, however, since the focus
here is on the principal's reckless conduct. For example, in
Wilson N Jones Memorial Hospital v. Davis,71 a hospital or-
derly injured the plaintiff when he negligently attempted to
remove a catheter. Although the orderly was merely negli-
gent and hence not himself liable for punitive damages, 72 the
Texas hospital was found punitively liable for its conscious
indifference to the safety of its patients in failing to check the
orderly's references prior to employment.73 In a factually
similar case, punitive damages against a North Carolina
hospital were denied where it was shown that the hospital
adequately investigated the negligent doctor before hiring
hir. 7 4
In cases like Wilson, the punitive liability of the principal
is clearly direct and not vicarious.75 Great care must be
taken in such cases to avoid holding the principal punitively
68. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 5.09; M. MINZER & J. NATES,
supra note 1, § 40.51[2], at 128. See also Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 826, § 16[a] (1979).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(b) ilustration 1 (1982).
70. M. MINZER & J. NATES, supra note 1, § 40.51[2], at 128-29.
71. 553 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
72. Id. at 180.
73. Id
74. Robinson v. Duszynski, 36 N.C. App. 103, 243 S.E.2d 148 (1978).
75. See D. DOBBS, supra note 27, § 3.9, at 214.
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liable for mere negligence in hiring an unfit agent. When
the principal's liability is direct, arguably the conduct would
have to evince the type of malice or evil motive which forms
the basis for a punitive award in the typical nonagency con-
text.76 Cases in which a principal has hired an unfit agent
with such a motive are probably rare, if only because such
conduct is clearly against the principal's economic self-
interest.
3. Ratification by the Principal.
Under the Restatement rule, a principal can be held lia-
ble for punitive damages assessed against an agent when the
principal ratifies the conduct which gave rise to the punitive
damages.77 Category (d) of Restatement section 909 ex-
presses this rule and includes the following illustration: "A,
the owner of a theatre, employs a special policeman to keep
order. In ejecting a small boy from the theatre, the police-
man cruelly abuses him. Upon learning the facts, A ex-
presses his approval. Punitive damages can properly be
awarded against A in an action for the battery. ' 78
Ratification differs from authorization in that it involves
approval after the malicious conduct itself.79 A ratifying
principal is therefore not a joint malicious tortfeasor, and
this liability has a larger vicarious component in comparison
to authorization. A ratifying principal is roughly analogous
to an accessory after the fact in the criminal law. Such ac-
cessories are generally not deemed to be as guilty as the ac-
tual perpetrator of the crime.80
The main issue in ratification cases concerns what type of
conduct will be deemed ratification. In some cases, evidence
might be adduced to show that a principal directly approved
76. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
77. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 5.11; M. MINZER & J. NATES,
supra note 1, § 40.51[2], at 131-32; 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 258 (1965); Note, supra
note 10, at 526. See also cases cited in Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 826, § 12 (1979).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 illustration 2 (1982).
79. Ratification refers to "confirmation of a previous act done either by the party
himself or by another. ... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1135 (5th ed. 1979).
80. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 946.47 (1981-82). Under this statute, an accessory af-
ter the fact is guilty of a Class E felony, at maximum.
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a wrongful act.8 ' These cases are presumably rare, however,
since it is obviously not in a principal's best interest to con-
done wrongful conduct on the part of agents.8 2
Ratification can be implied from the principal's actions
or inaction. Ratification has been found, for example, where
a party asked a principal for a repudiation of an agent's
wrongful act, but received none. 3 Indeed, some courts im-
pose a duty upon a principal with notice to immediately re-
pudiate a wrongful act lest ratification be found. 4
There is also authority for the rule that ratification will
be inferred where a principal retains an agent after a wrong-
ful act is committed. The better view, however, is that such
retention cannot alone establish ratification without proof of
other implicating facts.8 6 It is entirely possible, for example,
that an employer might retain an errant agent not out of an
intent to ratify the latter's wrongful acts, but simply because
the agent was a loyal and faithful servant for many years.87
Care must be taken not to infer ratification from acts not
necessarily indicative of it.
Fairness and common sense would seem to dictate that a
principal should not be deemed to have ratified an agent's
wrongful acts unless the principal had full knowledge of
those acts. 8 Of course, when the agent's conduct is wrongful
and adverse to the principal's interests, the agent's knowl-
81. See, e.g., Safeway Stores v. Gibson, 118 A.2d 386 (D.C. 1955), aft'a 237 F.2d
592 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
82. See Note, Recovery of Punitive Damages from Corporate Defendants for the
Tortious Acts of Employees, 10 LINCOLN L. REv. 207, 212 (1977).
83. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. Devercelli, 314 A.2d 767, 770 (D.C. 1974).
84. See, e.g., Ralphs v. Hensler, 97 Cal. 296, 303, 32 P. 243, 245 (1893), overruled
on other grounds, Flores v. Arroyd, 56 Cal. 2d 492, 364 P.2d 263, 15 Cal. Rptr. 87
(1961).
85. California courts follow this rule. See, e.g., Coats v. Construction & General
Laborers Local No. 185, 75 Cal. App. 3d 908, 93 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971). Wisconsin
courts may also follow the rule. See supra note 49.
86. See Woodard v. City Stores Co., 334 A.2d 189 (D.C. App. 1975). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C comment b (1958) ("Mere failure to
dismiss a servant, unaccompanied by conduct indicating approval of the wrongful
conduct, is not a sufficient basis on which to impose punitive damages.").
87. See, e.g., Vassau v. Madison Electric Ry., 106 Wis. 301, 82 N.W. 152 (1900).
88. This appears to be the rule in most jurisdictions. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Dam-
ages § 259 (1965); Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 826, § 12[b] (1979). ButseeS.H. Kress & Co.
v. Rust, 132 Tex. 89, _, 120 S.W.2d 425,428 (1938) (less than full knowledge deemed
sufficient for ratification).
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edge should not be imputed to the principal.8 9 A contrary
view would render the rule requiring full knowledge before
ratification nugatory, since the principal could never be
without imputed knowledge of an agent's wrongful conduct.
B. The Rule Evaluated
The gist of the criticism against the scope of employment
rule is that the purposes for punitive damages - punishment
and deterrence - are ill served when such damages are as-
sessed against someone not an actual wrongdoer.90 Insofar
as the Restatement rule imposes punitive damages against a
principal only when the principal has acted wrongfully, the
Restatement rule would appear to avoid the central defects of
the scope of employment rule and particularly the ethical
objections to vicarious punishment. A closer examination of
the Restatement rule, however, reveals that these defects are
not completely avoided.
The scope of employment rule is objectionable simply be-
cause the liability imposed under it is vicarious. Even under
the Restatement rule, however, at least a portion of the prin-
cipal's punitive liability can remain vicarious in certain cir-
cumstances. This is because the Restatement rule functions
both as a measure of liability and as a measure of damages.
Consider the various predicates to a principal's punitive
liabilty under the Restatement rule: authorization, reckless-
ness in hiring a malicious agent, and ratification. A-closer
examination of these predicates reveals two things. First,
they do not entail equivalent degrees of culpability. For ex-
ample, as discussed earlier, authorization involves joint ma-
licious conduct where the principal acts as a joint
tortfeasor,91 while ratification involves mere post-factum ap-
proval where the principal's role is more passive.9 2 This mis-
match in culpability is evidenced by the differing degrees of
punishment which attach to the criminal law counterparts of
authorization and ratification.9 3
89. See Ghiardi, supra note 37, at 773-74.
90. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 59 & 80 and accompanying text.
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More importantly, however, none of the three predicates
to a principal's liability under the Restatement rule, with the
possible exception of authorization, represents conduct
which is necessarily as egregious as the agent's punishable
conduct. This is particularly the case with ratification. Al-
though approval of wrongful conduct is admittedly repre-
hensible, it strains reason to claim that such approval is as
deserving of punishment as the wrongful conduct itself, par-
ticularly where the approval is merely implied from the prin-
cipal's actions or inaction.94
Despite the foregoing, so long as the principal satisfies at
least one of the stated predicates to liability, the full punitive
damage assessment against the agent will be imputed to the
principal under the Restatement rule. This is true even
though the principal's conduct, although admittedly wrong-
ful, is far less culpable than the agent's and may not alone
warrant a punitive damage award. In this sense, the princi-
pal's liability under the Restatement rule remains in part
purely vicarious, and to this portion of liability attaches all
the criticisms of the scope of employment rule discussed
earlier.
Moreover, since the three predicates to a principal's lia-
bility represent different degrees of culpability, twa princi-
pals facing identical agent misconduct will suffer identical
imputed damage awards, even though one principal may
have acted much more egregiously than the other. This re-
sult would appear to violate two cardinal rules of jurispru-
dence: that the punishment should fit the crime, and that
equally culpable wrongdoers should face equal
punishments.
C Refining the Restatement Rule: A Proposalfor Change
A rather simple alteration of the Restatement rule would
remove the remaining inequities. The liability and damage
aspects of the rule should be bifurcated, and the assessment
of punitive damages should be conducted separately for both
the principal and agent. Under the liability aspect of the
rule, proof that the principal authorized or ratified the
94. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
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agent's malicious conduct, or recklessly hired the agent,
would ab initio render the principal liable for punitive dam-
ages. Only after this initial liability was established would
the jury be allowed to assess an actual punitive amount.
Once the liability element was satisfied, the jury would be
instructed to separately assess punitive damages according to
the principal's degree of culpability and the amount neces-
sary to adequately serve the punishment and deterrence ra-
tionales. The jury would be explicitly instructed to consider
only the principal's conduct in this determination, separate
and apart from the agent's conduct and liability for punitive
damages.
The requirement that the jury first find the principal lia-
ble for punitive damages, prior to affixing the actual amount,
is not a mere redundancy. At the outset of the deliberative
process, this requirement focuses the jury's attention on the
principal's conduct alone and helps ensure that the jury will
not later arrive at a partially imputed damage assessment.
Under this scheme, it is entirely possible for the jury to ini-
tially find the principal liable for punitive damages but later
assess no damages. This situation might occur, for example,
where the jury determined that although the principal's con-
duct was wrongful, a punitive award under the deterrence
rationale would be pointless because the conduct would
probably not recur.95 The jury might also feel that the prin-
cipal's conduct was simply not egregious enough to warrant
a punitive award or that imputed compensatory damages
would be sufficient. Separate punitive assessment will help
ensure that the principal's punitive liability bears some ra-
tional relationship to the wrongfulness of the principal's con-
duct. The facts surrounding the principal's involvement will
evidence varying degrees of culpability from case to case,
and the modified Restatement rule will allow this variability
to be reflected in actual punitive awards.
Support for these proposed modifications in the Restate-
ment rule can be found in the law regarding the punitive lia-
bility of joint tortfeasors. It has been stated:
In most jurisdictions punitive damages may be rendered
against joint tortfeasors in varying amounts, or rendered
95. See supra notes 10- 11 and accompanying text.
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against some defendants but not against others. This result
is logical, since in many instances it can be proven that one
joint tortfeasor acted with malice while another did not, or
that there was differing degrees of culpability among the
co-defendants. A tortfeasor whose individual conduct
would not warrant a penalty should not have to suffer for
the conduct or evil motive of a co-defendant.96
When a principal and agent act as joint tortfeasors, separate
punitive assessments clearly should be made. Even when
the principal and agent are not technically joint tortfeasors,
however, the inherent logic and fairness of separate assess-
ment still dictates that procedure.
V. SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS IN THE VICARIOUS
LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Liability of Corporations
The rules regarding vicarious punitive liability discussed
to this point apply to situations where both the principal and
agent are individual persons. While it has been suggested
that the vicarious liability of corporations for punitive dam-
ages is governed by the same rules which apply to individu-
als, 97 closer examination of the issue indicates it cannot be so
easily resolved. Very complex problems arise when the prin-
cipal is an abstract corporate entity, the ownership and man-
agement of which are separated.
When the principal is a corporation, some courts follow
the rule that vicarious punitive liability is proper where the
agent was a corporate officer or other high level managerial
employee.98 This position also represents the Restatement
view: "Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a
master or other principal because of an act by an agent if,
but only if. . .the agent was employed in a managerial ca-
96. M. MINZER & J. NATES, supra note 1, § 40.55[2] (citations omitted). See also
D. DOBBS, supra note 27, § 3.9, at 215-16; 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 262 (1965).
97. See AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 260 (1965).
98. See, e.g., Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 522 P.2d 1102
(1974); Sparrow v. Vermont Say. Bank, 95 Vt. 29, 112 A. 205 (1921). See also
Remeikis v. Boss & Phelps, Inc., 419 A.2d 986 (D.C. 1980); J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER,
supra note 10, § 5.10; M. MINZER & J.NATES, supranote 1, § 40.5112], at 130-31; An-
not., 93 A.L.R.3d 826, § 7[b] (1979).
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pacity and was acting within the scope of employment
"599
The above rule probably evolved partly in response to
the fictional notion that a corporation is identical to its
agents and that therefore no distinction can be made be-
tween the acts or guilt of the agent and the acts or guilt of
the corporation. One author eloquently expresses this view
as follows:
A corporation is an imaginary thing. It has no mind but
the mind of its servants. It has no voice but the voice of its
servants. . .. All its schemes or mischief as well as
schemes of public enterprise are conceived by human
minds and executed by human hands. All attempts there-
fore to distinguish between the guilt of the servant and the
guilt of the corporation or the malice of the servant and the
punishment of the corporation. . . are sheer nonsense, and
only tend to confuse the mind and confound the
judgment, o
Under this view, when an agent of a corporation com-
mits a malicious tort, the resulting corporate punitive liabil-
ity is not really "vicarious," since no distinction is made
between the agent and the corporation. Theoretically at
least, the corporate liability is direct, and the result is very
similar to what would occur if the scope of employment rule
were applied.101 If one fully accepted the view that a corpo-
ration and its agents are equivalent, it would seem irrelevant
to distinguish between managerial and nonmanagerial
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(c) (1979). The Restatement offers
this illustration:
A, a corporation owning a series of retail stores, employs B as operations man-
ager to supervise the management of the units. While visiting a unit B discov-
ers facts that lead him to believe erroneously that one of the clerks has been
stealing. He directs the local manager to imprison the clerk. In the ensuing
interview he permits the local manager to use outrageous means of intimida-
tion. In the clerk's action against the corporation, punitive damages can prop-
erly be awarded.
Id illustration 3. This illustration indicates that corporate punitive liability will also
result when an officer or managerial agent authorizes or ratifies a malicious tort.
100. W.B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 327 (2d ed. 1912) (quot-
ing Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 57 Me. 202, 223-24 (1869)). See also
Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 176 So. 332 (1937); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc.
v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845 (1977); State v. Dried Milk Prods. Coop.,
16 Wis. 2d 357, 114 N.W.2d 412 (1962).
101. For a discussion of the scope of employment rule, see supra notes 27-48 and
accompanying text.
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agents when assessing the corporation's liability, and indeed
many of cases adopting the equivalency view do not make
that distinction.'0 2
Yet the managerial-nonmanagerial distinction is made.
One might argue that corporate officers or high level mana-
gerial employees are "more equivalent" to the corporation
than lower level agents in that the former are involved in
developing and administering corporate policy and therefore
"give identity" to the abstract corporate entity. Obviously,
however, this argument is artificial to a fault.
The better view is that the entire focus of the managerial-
nonmanagerial distinction is misplaced. In determining the
vicarious punitive liability of a corporation, the more sensi-
ble inquiry is not whether the agent held a managerial posi-
tion, itself difficult to define10 3 but rather whether the agent
was carrying out corporate policy in committing the mali-
cious acts.1°4 If such were the case, the corporate punitive
liability would again appear more direct than vicarious but
not because the corporation and the malicious agent were
somehow theoretically "identical." Rather, the corporate li-
ability would appear direct because the corporate policy it-
self evidenced a malicious intent and would be the focus of
the punitive award. Since corporate punitive liability ac-
102. See Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 176 So. 332 (1937); Hibschman
Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845 (1977); State v. Dried Milk
Prods. Coop., 16 Wis. 2d 357, 114 N.W.2d 412 (1962). In declining to make any
distinction between corporate agents based on rank, one court stated:
The president of a railway corporation is no more or less its agent than a
brakeman on one of its trains. His agency is broader, but it is not boundless,
and a matter which lies beyond its limits is as thoroughly beyond his powers as
any matter beyond the very much smaller circle of a brakeman's [sic] duties;
.. . There is just the same and no more reason, in our opinion, for inflicting
punishment on the corporation for the willful misconduct of the one as of the
other, and such punishment is no more vicarious in the one case than in the
other.
Mobile & O.R.R. v. Seals, 100 Ala. 368, _ 13 So. 917, 919-20 (1893).
103. According to one case, "[w]hether an employee acts in a 'managerial capac-
ity' does not necessarily depend on his 'level' in the corporate hierarchy." Grimshaw
v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 814, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 385 (1981). On
what, then, does it depend? One case suggested that managerial status depends on the
"nature of the authority conferred." Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App.
3d 659, 680-81, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899, 913 (1976). This phrase seems no more helpful
than the bare term "managerial."
104. See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 5.06.
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cording to this approach is predicated upon some fault on
the part of the corporate principal, the assessment of liability
operates similar to the Restatement rule.105
All of the foregoing approaches to corporate punitive lia-
bility suffer from one central defect: they adopt an inade-
quate and overly abstract definition of the corporate entity.
If a corporation is identical to anything, it is identical not to
its agents but to the shareholders who own it. "[Clustomary
judicial verbiage about imputing to the corporation the act
and intent of the offender is entirely figurative and glosses
over a defective analysis. The shareholders in their corpo-
rate capacity are treated as convenient hostages."' 10 6
The punitive liability of a corporation, therefore, "should
not be viewed as an abstract 'corporate' liability but rather
as that of the shareholders."'' 0 7 Shareholder punitive liabil-
ity, however, raises serious ethical questions. In the vast ma-
jority of circumstances, shareholders are innocent of any
wrongdoing when an agent of a corporation commits a mali-
cious tort, if only because shareholders are far removed from
the day-to-day management of the corporation and have no
direct opportunity to authorize or ratify malicious acts. 08
To the extent that shareholders are innocent, any punitive
liability assessed against them is morally repugnant for the
same reasons discussed earlier with reference to the scope of
employment rule. 0 9 As Dean Prosser said, many courts
have stressed "the injustice of a punishment inflicted upon
one who has been entirely innocent throughout. This is of
course particularly true where the employer is a corporation,
and the pocket which is hit is that of the blameless stock-
holders, whom no one wants to punish." 10
This "innocent shareholders" viewpoint has not gone un-
criticized. The shareholders' punitive liability does strip
105. For a discussion of the Restatement rule, see supra notes 49-96 and accompa-
nying text.
106. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 114, at 280 (1946).
107. Comment, supra note 3, at 1306.
108. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
110. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 2, at 12. See also Judge Friendly's oft cited
opinion in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967); C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 80, at 283 (1935); and Morris, supra note 39, at 218-19.
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them of illicit profits gained through cost-cutting measures
which sacrifice public safety."' It would seem, however,
that illicit corporate gains could be just as effectively wrested
from shareholders through common-law restitutionary prin-
ciples, without the additional ethical and evidentiary
problems associated with punitive awards. Moreover, this
argument simply assumes what it needs to prove: that any
given shareholder would in fact countenance the maximiza-
tion of profits at the expense of public safety. Even if moti-
vated solely by economic considerations, it would seem
unlikely that most shareholders would condone unsafe cost-
cutting measures, which increase the risk of compensatory-
damage exposure and jeopardize corporate goodwill.
Shareholder innocence aside, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has stated that shareholder liability operates to en-
courage shareholders to exercise closer control over the op-
eration of the entity."12  This argument, however,
overestimates the degree of managerial control which share-
holders possess. In actuality, "the shareholder is definitely
made subservient to the will of a controlling group of man-
agers."' 1 3 Insofar as shareholders lack actual control over
the management of a corporation," 4 the "closer control" ra-
tionale weakens.
Many of the problems associated with corporate liability
for punitive damages could be solved with a rule that im-
posed such damages only upon the individual corporate rep-
resentatives who actually authorized or ratified the malicious
conduct. That representative might be a managerial em-
111. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv.
1257, 1304-05 (1974).
112. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 291, 294 N.W.2d 437, 453-54
(1980).
113. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 227 (1933).
114. As one author stated:
Nominal power still resides in the stockholers; actual power in the board of
directors.
Essentially these stockholders, though politely called "owners," are passive.
They have the right to receive only. The condition of their being is that they
do not interfere in management. Neither in law nor, as a rule, in fact do they
have that capacity."
A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 74 (1959).
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ployee, a rank and file worker, a board director, or even a
shareholder or group of shareholders, under proper circum-
stances. Such a rule would avoid the ethical problems asso-
ciated with placing punitive liability upon innocent parties,
particularly shareholders. It would also provide greater in-
centive to avoid misconduct, since the liability would be
placed directly upon the actual wrongdoer or group of
wrongdoers.
Of course, this individual liability rule would result in a
shallower "pocket" being available for recovery, since the
corporate coffers could not be reached. Indeed, one author
has suggested that few lawyers would press punitive damage
claims if the corporation itself could not be held liable." 5 It
must be remembered, however, that the purposes for puni-
tive damages are to punish and deter, not to compensate the
victim. If6 If these purposes are adequately served by hold-
ing only the wrongdoer liable for individual misconduct,
there exists no valid reason for extending the liability
further.
B. Liability of Governmental Entities
1. Governmental Immunity
In the great majority of jurisdictions, states or municipal-
ities are not vicariously liable for punitive damages assessed
against its agents. 17 Various reasons have been offered for
115. Morris, supra note 39, at 219-20.
116. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
117. D. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 217; J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10,
§ 5.13; M. MINZER & J. NATES, supra note 1, § 40.54[2][a]. See also Annot., 19
A.L.R.2d 903 (1951). One court has held that this immunity may be waived by the
purchase of liability insurance. See Holda v. County of Kane, 88 Il. App. 3d 522,
410 N.E.2d 552, 557 (1980).
The following jurisdictions, by the named authority, do not allow punitive dam-
ages to be imposed vicariously against its governmental bodies: Alabama, City Coun-
cil of Montgomery v. Gilmer & Taylor, 33 Ala. 116 (1858); Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.50.280 (1983); Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-621 (Supp. 1983); Califor-
nia, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818 (West 1980); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-114
(1973) (but see Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979)); District of Colum-
bia, Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975); Florida, Fisher v. City
of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965); Georgia, City of Columbus v. Myszka, 246 Ga.
571, 272 S.E.2d 302 (1980); Hawaii, Lauer v. YMCA, 57 Hawaii 390, 557 P.2d 1334
(1976); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 6-918 (1979); Illinois, George v. Chicago Transit Au-
thority, 58 Il1. App. 3d 692, 374 N.E.2d 679 (1978); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-
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this rule:
(1) a punitive damage award against a governmental en-
tity would operate to punish innocent citizens, 18 whose taxes
would be raised or services cut back to make up for the
award;" 19
(2) the deterrence effect is inoperative due to potentially
16.5-4 (Bums Supp. 1984); Kansas, McHugh v. City of Wichita, 1 Kan. App. 2d 180,
563 P.2d 497 (1977); Minnesota, Desforge v. City of West St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 42
N.W.2d 633 (1950); Mississippi, Urban Renewal Agency v. Tackett, 255 So. 2d 904
(Miss. 1971); Missouri, Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1968);
Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-105 (1983); New Mexico, Rascoe v. Town of
Farmington, 62 N.M. 51, 304 P.2d 575 (1956); New York, Sharapata v. Town of Islip,
82 App. Div. 2d 350, 441 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1982); North Carolina, Long v. City of Char-
lotte, 306 N.C. 187, 293 S.E.2d 101 (1982); Ohio, Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41
Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975); Oklahoma, Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d
1283 (Okla. 1976); South Carolina, Lineberger v. City of Greenville, 178 S.C. 47, 182
S.E. 101 (1935); Texas, Cole v. City of Houston, 442 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-22 (1953); West Virginia, Wilson v. City of
Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323 (1882); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(3) (1981-82).
There is no authority on point for the following states: Arkansas, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia and Wyoming. The law in the following jurisdic-
tions is unclear: Kentucky, City of Covington v. Faulhaber, 117 Ky. 623, 197 S.W.
1065 (1917) (no evidence of the necessary conduct and thus no recovery of punitive
damages; appears to indicate punitive damages are recoverable if the necessary con-
duct is proven); Oregon, Gigler v. City of Klamath Falls, 537 P.2d 121 (Ore. App.
1975) (plaintiff unable to maintain a cause of action due to failure to prove defend-
ant's conduct outrageous; no discussion of punitive damages); Pennsylvania, Henni-
gan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (stating state courts
would hold city liable for punitive damages if question were considered; court did
hold city liable for punitive damages); Vermont, Willett v. City of St. Albans, 69 Vt.
468, 39 A. 72 (1897) (case appears to allow punitive damages against a municipal
corporation if the municipality either authorized or subsequently approved the
wrongful act or neglect). There are no punitive damages allowed in the following
states: Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska and Washington.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States government cannot be held
liable for punitive damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). In jurisdictions where only
punitive damages are allowed in wrongful death actions, the federal government will
be liable only for actual or compensatory damages. Id
Similarly, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a foreign state cannot be
held liable for punitive damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1982). In foreign states when
only punitive damages are allowed in wrongful death actions, the foreign state will be
liable for the actual or compensatory damages suffered by the surviving beneficiaries.
Id
118. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, _, 579 P.2d 568, 570-71 (Ct. App.
1979); George v. Chicago Transit Auth., 58 111. App. 3d 692, _, 374 N.E.2d 679, 680-
81 (1978); Foss v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 309 A.2d 339, 345-46 (Me. 1973); Fischer v.
City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965).
119. D. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 217.
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unlimited governmental wealth 120 and high turnover in
leadership; 12 1
(3) unlimited governmental resources make it impossible
to arrive at a wealth-based verdict which would serve the
purposes of punitive damages; 22
(4) disciplinary action by supervisors against errant em-
ployees provides sufficient punishment and deterrence; 123
(5) public control through the political process provides
an adequate remedy; 124 and
(6) the governmental entity is immune from liability for
compensatory damages and therefore cannot be held liable
for punitive damages. 25
It is interesting to note that reasons (1) and (4) above also
justify corporate immunity for punitive damages. Just as
punitive damages against municipalities punish innocent cit-
izens, such damages against corporations punish innocent
shareholders. Similarly, disciplinary action by corporate su-
pervisors provides the same deterrent to errant conduct as
disciplinary action by government supervisors. In arguing
that the deterrent effect of punitive damages does not apply
to municipalities, one court stated that "a huge award
against the City would not necessarily deter other employees
who generally would be unable to pay a judgment assessed
against them personally." 126 This statement remains largely
true if the word "corporation" is put in the place of "city. 127
2. Governmental Liability
In a few jurisdictions, a governmental entity may be held
vicariously liable for punitive damages assessed against its
120. See Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, _, 321 N.E.2d 885, 889
(1975).
121. D. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 218.
122. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, _ 579 P.2d 568, 571 (Ct. App.
1979); Fischer v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965).
123. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, _, 579 P.2d 568, 571 (Ct. App.
1979); Fischer v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965).
124. D. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 217.
125. Id.
126. Fischer v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965).
127. For a discussion of corporate liability for punitive damages, see supra notes
97-116 and accompanying text.
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agents.1 28 Courts adopting this rule typically reject the rea-
sons advanced in favor of immunity1 29 and argue that, de-
spite the weaknesses in the employer diligence rationale,
governmental punitive liability will promote greater care in
the selection and training of employees. 30 It appears that
the jurisdictions which follow this rule require some fault on
the part of the governmental entity as a predicate to liability,
similar to the Restatement rule regarding vicarious punitive
liability in the non-governmental context.' 3'
The liability rule has little modem support, 132 except per-
haps in situations where there has been a serious abuse of
governmental power.133 The United States Supreme Court
has expressed clear disapproval of government liability for
punitive damages, 34 and the rule should probably be
abandoned.
VI. CONCLUSION
Much controversy has surrounded the issue of whether it
is proper to impose punitive damages upon defendants in the
civil context. That controversy is heightened when attempts
are made to vicariously impose punitive damages against a
party who was not an active wrongdoer. Great caution must
be exercised by our courts to ensure that punitive damages
are vicariously imposed only under circumstances where the
128. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 5.14; M. MINZER & J. NATES,
supra note 1, § 40.54[2][b]. See, e.g., Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F. Supp.
667 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aft'd, 400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904
(1969); Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979); Young v. City of Des
Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978).
129. See, e.g., Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 621-22 (Iowa
1978). For a discussion of the reasons offered in support of the scope of employment
rule, see supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
130. Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 621-22 (Iowa 1978).
131. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 5.15. But see Young v. City of
Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 612 (Iowa 1978), in which the court held that municipal
punitive liability will be determined by the same legal principles which apply to cor-
porate liability. In Iowa, a corporation may be held vicariously liable for punitive
damages even though the corporation itself was innocent of any wrongdoing. Nor-
thrup v. Miles Homes, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1973).
132. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, § 5.15, at 47.
133. See D. DOBBS, supra note 27, § 3.9, at 218.
134. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-67 (1981).
This case also held that a municipality is immune from liability for punitive damages
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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purposes for punitive awards - punishment and deterrence
- will be served. Toward that end, three changes in the law
regarding vicarious punitive liability are proposed: first, that
the scope of employment rule regarding such liability be
abandoned; second, that courts follow the Restatement rule
but that it be modified so that punitive damages are sepa-
rately assessed against the principal and agent, and only
when both have acted wrongfully; and third, that corporate
liability for punitive damages be abolished in favor of a rule
which would impose punitive damages only upon the indi-
vidual employees guilty of actual misconduct. These
changes in effect abrogate "pure" vicarious liability for puni-
tive damages, a result justified by the fact that such liability
is unethical and ill serves the purposes which underlie the
punitive damage doctrine.
